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Abstract: The editorial discusses the status and prospects of the commons of 
developed industrialized countries, based on the literature. For the traditional 
commons, one key variable for long-term development prospects of the commons 
is found in the way ownership to the commons is structured. A second key variable 
is the way increasing knowledge, including scientific environmental knowledge, 
has affected our perception of what a resource is within a commons and its value. 
The way these two variables characterizing commons: “structure of ownership” 
and “knowledge of valuable resources” are related is illustrated in a process 
referred to as “the withering away” with potential for widely diverging outcomes. 
Also new emerging urban commons are commented on and a more indepth study 
of both traditional and new urban commons is called for.
Keywords: Commons, developed countries, England, industrialized countries, 
Japan, knowledge commons, Spain, traditional commons, urban commons
1. Introduction
The class of “developed industrialized countries” may not be entirely self-
explanatory. In the context we provide here there are articles reporting on the 
situation in Japan, Spain, England, and Norway. We consider countries similar 
to these to be developed and industrialized. Such countries are characterized by 
having a low proportion of population in rural areas and an even tinier fraction 
of the population employed in agriculture today. However, traditional commons 
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were tied to agricultural production in a rural setting, leading one to expect that 
they would be shrinking in both economic importance and physical size.
Nevertheless, the developed industrialized countries today appear to have a 
growing diversity of activities inspired by the idea of a commons as a form of 
organisation outside the state that is capable of supplying collective benefits that 
everyone in a local community needs. Today, both the needs and the activities are 
quite likely to be urban and tied to urban communities. These communities were 
not in our minds when we set out to explore the fate of traditional commons in 
developed industrialized countries. But they clearly should be a topic for further 
research, and not only into their use of the idea of a commons.
We shall return to these new types of urban commons in the developed 
industrialized countries at several points below, but will first turn to the more 
traditional commons. As a historical phenomenon traditional commons are 
mainly found in rural areas1 and have been exploited by the rural population 
for survival in an economy dominated by agriculture. The task we originally set 
ourselves was to consider the fate of these traditional commons during the process 
called industrialization and development. Part of this process is usually the 
individualization (or privatization) process generally labelled as enclosure. This 
process is extensively researched in the history of England. For other countries 
the knowledge is less systematic; however, based on the studies presented below 
and other readings our conclusion is that in the long term the traditional commons 
of developed industrialized countries have been declining in importance, not 
only to the societies as one might have expected, but also to the rural agricultural 
population. The areas known as commons have shrunk and the number of 
exploited resources has declined, but the trends are not uniform.
Although Berge and Haugset (in this issue) conclude that the Norwegian 
commons are withering away, Shimada (2014) emphasizes the efforts of Japanese 
iriai to adapt to new externally imposed conditions. But he also notes that many of 
them meet problems they cannot solve alone. For England and Wales it would seem 
that the “withering away” has halted and a trend where environmental resources 
and recreational use gain acceptance as valuable commons resources in addition 
to the remaining “profits-á-prendre” (Rodgers et al. 2011). In Spain Lana Berasain 
(2008) emphasizes the elements of class struggle in the process of privatization of 
commons and the recovery of commons during periods of democratic governance. 
In communities in Navarra he links this to a shift in the use of commons from 
an emphasis on equilibrium to equity. Today the legislation of Navarra explicitly 
favours the poor in the allocation of arable from the common lands.2
One key variable for long-term development prospects of the commons is 
found in the way ownership to the commons is structured. A second key variable 
1
 But the history of traditional urban commons should be investigated more systematically.
2
 See e.g. Article 158 in Regulations on Local Authority Property in Navarra (approved through 
 Navarra Decree 280/1990 of 18 October) (part) (Official Gazette of Navarra, no. 145, de 30  November 
1990). An unauthorized translation is available in Berge (2006, 15–34). 
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is the way increasing knowledge, including scientific/environmental knowledge, 
has affected our perception of what a resource is within a commons and its value. 
These two variables characterizing commons: “structure of ownership” and 
“knowledge of valuable resources” are related to each other during the process 
referred to as “the withering away” with potential for widely diverging outcomes.
2. New commons emerging in developed industrialized 
countries
For example, in 2008 Oslo got a new opera house. In the summer of 2013 visitors 
to the opera house were met with the following announcement: “Here comes the 
“Opera Commons” explaining: “Operaallmenningen” (the Opera Commons) “will 
be a multi-functional meeting place for cultural events, recreational activities and 
people passing through.” The announcement is interesting. The Norwegian word 
“allmenning” is usually translated as “commons” and will in most cases designate 
a very old form of joint ownership or ownership in common among a well-defined 
group of commoners that by Norwegian law are required to be active farmers. 
Their current legal reality is regulated in legislation from 1857, 1863, and 1920 
with the last major revision from 1992.3
The naming of this square as the “Opera commons”, located beside the Opera 
house and in front of the new library of Oslo, will indicate that an urban commons 
in Norway is constructed as an urban area with very little “green stuff” and will 
appear as very different from the urban parks that are constructed as nature areas 
with grass, trees, and flowers, sometimes with a classical garden design and 
usually managed by a municipal office. In their green appearance, urban parks are 
similar to national parks.
However, the urban commons is not a new invention. The tradition of English 
town and village greens is rooted in traditional commons that used to be available 
for people in villages and towns to graze their animals.4 From the outside they do 
not seem to be very different from urban parks but their origin and management 
are different. Town and village greens have for more than hundred years been 
used for sports and recreation.5 Many are owned and maintained by local parish 
or community councils, though some are privately owned. Some of them still 
maintain “rights of common” over them.6
3
 The 1992 acts are available in English translation in Berge et al. (2011).
4
 In Norway the traditional urban commons were called “takmark” and have today disappeared as 
such, but in some places the area remains as “Bymark”, available for the citizens for recreational 
activities (Christiansen et al. 2006). 
5
 The shift from rural to urban interests in use of commons is noticeable in legislation at least from 
1866, see Metropolitan commons Act 1866 and Commons Act 1876 (Halsbury 1968, 859–898). 
6
 The Commons Registration Act 1965 defines town or village greens as land on which inhabitants 
of any locality have a right mandated by law, custom, or public acceptance (not less than 20 years) to 
indulge in lawful sports and pastimes (Halsbury 1968, 934), see also amendments in the Countryside 
and Rights of Way Act 2000, section 98, clarifying the definition.
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The choice of “allmenning” (commons) to designate a place that is available 
for citizens of Oslo and their visitors as a “meeting place for cultural events, 
recreational activities and people passing through” may be part of an international 
trend idolizing “the commons”. This trend one may observe both in academia and 
in some political circles.
Tine de Moor has been following this development for some time (Moor 2012; 
2013; Moor 2015, 161–168). Her perspective is to look at the organisation of 
the commoners, the people who will benefit from the joint management of some 
resource that is, or could be, held in common. She notes a remarkable growth in 
the number of cooperative organisations (or associations or foundations) in the 
area of energy supply and production, as well as production or supply of health 
care, carpooling, food, insurance, and infrastructure like open source software.
From the perspective of the theory of the commons, the most interesting 
feature is that these collectives are self-organized and work according to bylaws 
enacted by the members to provide an equitable distribution of goods for its 
members. In other ways, the diversity of their goals and modes of operation is 
rather bewildering. One might at first blush think that this development is triggered 
by a failure of the welfare state. But it operates more like a supplement, probably 
triggered by the increasing complexity of modern states. It is not reasonable to 
think that unified top-down (welfare) systems, those that the state will have to 
create, will be able to provide for all contingencies without creating a bureaucracy 
that will tend to break down under its own complexity. Self-organized commons 
may well be emerging to cover additional contingencies.
3. Observations from commons of developed industrialized 
countries
Moor et al. (2002, 252–253) outlined four ways of gaining rights to exploit a 
commons: 1) holding title to land with rights of common appurtenant, 2) being 
member of a community or municipality conferring such rights on their members, 
as well as 3) being member of a cooperative or an association with rights to a 
suitable resource. The fourth way, they say, is where all subjects of a ruler 
have rights to enjoy the resources within areas large enough to ensure that no 
competition among commoners arises.7
Below, we present 4 articles that study aspects of commons in Japan, Spain, 
England, and Norway. They present rather different perspectives. The study from 
Japan (Shimada 2015) presents an old style iriai, a semi-natural grassland. Current 
agricultural practice is unable to use it in traditional ways and the grassland 
would in a few years grow over, destroying the plants that had evolved through 
many centuries of traditional agriculture. A portion of Japan’s biodiversity would 
disappear. Until now this development has been halted by the efforts of a group 
7
 In Scandinavia this is known as “all men’s rights” and is concerned with recreational usage of 
wilderness areas (Shimada and Murota 2013). 
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of volunteers maintaining the traditional burning of the grassland that is the key 
to maintaining the plant community there. But how sustainable is such volunteer 
activity? The theory of the commons can give some clues to understand how 
a group of volunteers needs to be organised to sustain its activities. But is it 
applicable here with pure public goods (biodiversity and a pleasing landscape) as 
the only outcome?
The article on Spain (Lana and Iriarte-Goñi 2015) presents a survey of 
the developments of the traditional commons during the last part of the 20th 
century. After the privatization policy of the 19th century, the 20th century saw 
the commons recover and receive legal recognition. The trend has been towards 
greater regional diversity and less influence from the central state. One of the 
problems encountered is closely tied to the different and often incompatible 
definitions of common lands used by different government agencies. This has 
been an issue in forest administration and forest exploitation. The centrally 
promulgated regulations for agricultural activity, environmental protection, and 
social equity have been assisted in their implementation by using and expanding 
on the inherent flexibility of the diversity of commons institutions. The tension 
between the local commons/ commoners and the central state bureaucracy is at the 
core of the fate of the Spanish commons. But not everything can be decentralized 
with good consequences. The theory of the commons may provide some advice 
on what powers need to remain with central authority and what can be given back 
to the commoners.
The article about Norway (Berge and Haugset 2015) presents a case study of 
an old style “King’s commons” that in 1801 was conveyed to a local proprietor. 
But it did not stop being a commons immediately. The case study tells a story 
about a slow withering away of the rights of common until today right of pasture 
for a few farms in the vicinity is all that remains. The withering away is explained 
by the technological changes in agricultural production and a fixed inflexible 
property rights regime for rights of common. One observation in this history may 
have more general interest. In 1857 all commons were reclassified into 3 types 
and the case presented here belongs to the class “private commons” that was 
supposed to be dissolved within 20 years, according to legislation from 1863. The 
belief that this dissolution had (or should have) occurred seems to be the most 
likely explanation for the removal of the right to fish and the right to hunt from 
private commons but not from the other types of commons. Despite the belief in 
the non-existence of these commons subject to automatic dissolution, judgements 
from the Supreme Court – one from 1930, one from 1937, and one from 2000 – 
confirm the existence of 3 different private commons. More might be found if one 
looked for them. Maybe the lawmakers suffered from structural amnesia when 
removing rights from the private commons?
The study from England (Pieraccini 2015) focuses on the creation of protected 
areas in the sea in Marine Conservation Zones (MCZ). This way of protecting 
biodiversity in the sea arguably creates a new type of commons, and the article 
compares this to the established protected areas on land that are called Sites of 
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Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). The two types of protected areas have to some 
extent the same objectives (the protection of biodiversity/ conservation of nature), 
and they have the same beneficiaries (the public and future generations), differing 
from traditional commons. While traditional commons clearly have commoners 
benefitting from the resources and actively contributing to their management, 
these new commons have different purposes and beneficiaries. Who can best 
represent the interests of these new commons? Can a legitimate constituency of 
commoners be constructed for such new commons, or will its management have 
to be the task of a state bureaucracy? The article answers this question comparing 
the different degree of democratic legitimacy in the laws on SSSIs and MCZs 
drawing on deliberative democratic theory.
4. The structure of ownership
The key variable that we call “structure of ownership” is seen in the ownership 
status given to specific resources. In some property rights systems, specific 
exploitations or uses (e.g. pasture) are seen as “objects” that have property rights 
protection in the same way as for example the ownership of a building lot in an 
urban area. This opens the possibility for a split between the owner of the ground 
(or soil) of the commons and the owner(s) of the specific resources attached to the 
ground (grass, trees, minerals) or flowing over the ground (water, game animals). 
The most common form for structuring ownership to traditional commons, 
probably the default condition, is defining the local community as owner of 
both ground and resources. Specific rights to exploit a resource or a parcel of the 
commons can of course be leased or rented or given to specific members of the 
community that owns a commons. But the specific rights are not severed from 
the commons. They are handled according to the specific details of the contract. 
Long-term leases have been observed to lead to problems in relations between 
community and leaseholder (e.g. long term leases for timber production in Spain).
The owner of a commons is expected to hold and manage the commons for 
the benefit of the community members. The local community may be seen as a 
public body or as a private body or somewhere in between. It may be as small as 
a village of 3 households and 15 individuals.8 As villages grow, the problem of 
collective action emerges. At some point one resource will not be able to serve all 
members of the village and the problems of just access and distribution appear. 
History shows many ways of handling this problem, enclosure is just one, and for 
many kinds of resources it does not work well. Multi-level governance is another 
approach. In Shimada’s paper in this issue, the commons reported on is formally 
owned by Nara Prefecture with a population of approximately 1.4 million. The 
commons was originally owned by Tarōji community, part of Soni village. In 1971, 
Nara prefecture bought the semi-natural grassland. At that time, Nara prefecture 
8
 This is the legal minimum in Navarra, Spain (Art 37.2 in Ley Foral de la Administracion Local de 
Navarra). No village this small has been observed. 
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and Soni village exchanged memorandums in which Nara prefecture promised 
that people in Tarōji could continue using their grass resources in accordance with 
accepted customs. Actual utilization and management activities of the grassland 
were mainly done by people in Tarōji. In addition to Nara prefecture, the municipal 
government of Soni village also support the management of grassland by paying 
money for it. In this case the formal ownership is used to create a multilevel 
system of management for the commons.
In Norway the state is the owner of most of the areas called commons. But 
in Norway there is a tradition of owning specific resources separately from the 
ground. This way of structuring ownership to the commons is based on a distinction 
between the land surface of an area and the specific other resource found within 
the area. The owner of the area is the one owning the ground. The resources 
that can be exploited in any way, can, but do not have to be, owned by people 
or organisations other than the one owning the land. Today such exploitation 
rights will be organised according to contracts. But due to the ancient origin of 
the traditional commons, the commoners of England and Norway became owners 
of the resources they exploited.9 In England, since 1066, the manorial lord owned 
the ground. The commoners owned the “profits-à-prendre” that they could exploit 
and the manorial lord owned the rest, the remainder. In Norway the remainder 
became bundled with the ground, in England it became bundled with the notion 
of fee simple ownership (the Crown’s claim to ownership of the ground still exists 
in England, but is not needed for a modern state’s powers to govern and tax). In 
Norway there was a slow transition from the medieval commons – which the King 
was granted only powers to manage – to the “King’s commons” of the 17th century 
that the King started to sell. The paper from Norway starts with the sale of such 
a King’s commons and tells the story of how rights to timber and hunting rights 
to small game within this commons were lost in a slow 200 years process. This 
process would have been unthinkable without the clear separation of ownership of 
the ground and remainder from the ownership of the rights of common.
The paper from England comparing new environmental commons on land and 
at sea notes that structures of ownership have an impact on the way the two are 
managed. The land area of a SSSI has an owner and the management of the area 
is based on contract between the owner and the state agency. At sea there are no 
owners to contract with and a wide diversity of users. This opens the opportunity 
for wider participation in the management.
5. The knowledge of resources
The traditional resources of the commons were intimately related to the way 
agriculture was conducted. It was pasture for cattle, often including collection of 
fodder for the winter, it was firewood for heating and cooking, it was timbers for 
building houses, and even land for new farms if needed. But the commons also 
9
 A more in depth comparison of property rights in England and Norway is found in Berge (2002). 
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comprised a variety of more abundant goods such as berries, herbs, and small 
game animals. It was more difficult to gain information of their status and monitor 
their exploitation. Abundance assured that enforcement of exclusive rights was 
not worth the effort. Such resources became more or less an all men’s right.
The general picture from all the four countries is that the value of the resources 
traditionally defined as rights of common has been declining due to the abundance 
and low price of products produced by industrialized forestry and agriculture, or 
by more convenient alternatives for heating and cooking such as electricity, oil, 
and coal. The most persistent of the rights of common seems to be pasture used 
by livestock farmers as supplement for the fodder harvested on the farms. But 
also the use of outfield pasture is declining. If the traditional goods were the only 
resources offered by the commons they would seem to be heading for status as 
wilderness areas where humans seldom need to go. But the growth in knowledge 
about the world we inhabit has found new resources in the commons.
The contribution from Japan tells a story of how a particular type of grass used 
to be harvested to provide thatched roofs. As modern technology produced new 
types of roofing material more easily accessible, the uses for the grass declined 
and the areas maintained for this grass was abandoned to grow over by forest. 
As the last of such grasslands was disappearing, a group of volunteers resolved 
to maintain some of it, lest all should disappear. The demand for the grass had 
dwindled to almost nothing, because only a few houses with traditional thatched 
roofs are still maintained. However, part of the concern for the disappearing 
grassland was related to loss of biodiversity. This was new knowledge intervening 
and redefining the value of the grasslands. It was no longer useful for ordinary 
roofing purposes. But during the hundreds of years where it had been maintained 
for this purpose a particular ecosystem had evolved within the grasslands. If human 
activity stopped, the more robust ecosystems of the nearby forests would take 
over, probably destroying those systems that depended on human maintenance.
6. Environmental commons
Usually ecosystems found in commons do not depend critically on the human 
management of the commons as indicated by the example from Japan above. 
The biodiversity of self-maintained ecosystems is recognized and growing in 
importance. This applies also to ecosystems in the oceans and coastal areas. The 
sea near coastal areas has been studied both as open access areas for fishing and 
as commons for a group of local fishers. The tragedy of the commons has been 
observed for some of the fish stocks. The same areas along many coasts are also 
used for many other activities ranging from recreation to waste disposal, and the 
ecosystems are threatened as much as on land. Since the sea resembles commons 
much more than private property the article from England explores how the 
design of management systems for protected areas on land can learn from the 
management of protected areas in the sea. The fact that the new commons on land 
have owners while the new commons at sea areas do not makes it easier for the 
latter to create a participatory management.
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One important service of many commons, even if unrecognized, has been to 
provide eco-system services such as freshwater or protection against avalanches 
and landslides for urban communities downstream from the commons (Olschewski 
et al. 2012). During the last few decades there have been several experiments in 
devising systems for paying landowners for the provision of eco-system services 
(Neef and Thomas 2009). The value of biodiversity and ecosystem services is 
now acknowledged everywhere even if the best way of managing such public 
values is not. Also more commercial values have been identified. Waterfalls and 
room for windmills have made the production of electricity a valuable activity 
also within areas known as commons.
7. Trends in the development of commons
For traditional commons the trend in Norway is for declining exploitation by 
individual commoners while the exploitation by organised businesses, usually 
owned and organised by the commoners or by the state, is steady or increasing. 
Sometimes this process implies transfer of control from local entities to larger 
scale public bodies or public companies. In Spain and Japan as well as England 
and Wales it is the same.
Rodgers et al. (2011) explore environmental governance on common land. 
While the commons as an important element in the rural economy has been 
declining, they find it far from extinct. They also record the same tension as seen 
in Norway between the public interests in protected landscapes and the private 
interests in customary exploitation. But arguably the private interests have a 
stronger legal position than in Norway. The public regulations have to be more 
sensitive to local conditions. The paper on marine conservation zones continue 
the investigation of protected areas as commons asking about the commoners. If 
the goods of the commons are pure public goods everybody is a commoner. But 
how do you organize the exploitation, monitoring and sanctioning in protected 
areas at sea? Who will pay the cost? And what about possible external effects 
distributing non-monetary costs inequitably?
In Japan Murota and Takeshita (2013) by and large find that exploitation of 
traditional commons (iriai) is declining and rights are in some cases privatized. 
But the processes are different from those observed in Norway and England. The 
formal powers regulating the exploitation are local governments interfering in the 
commons through the system of property wards that was the outcome of struggles 
over a local government reform from 1889. The property wards provided funding 
for public infrastructure. But in reality it was the individual land users who found 
ways of joint exploitation to everybody’s advantage (continuing the iriai system). 
This caused customs to be a strong source for legal adjudication as conflicts 
arose. The duality of property ward and iriai became a working polycentric 
system with a dual power structure. But urbanization and industrialisation has 
caused a process of scaling up of local governments creating new regulatory 
bodies for the property wards with less knowledge of the customary ways of 
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the iriai. Mergers of municipalities have proven a threat to the functioning and 
legitimacy of the property wards. At the same time declining use of the commons 
from fewer villagers, failed government forest policies, and increasing attention 
to environmental protection created new conditions for the commoners requiring 
new responses. The various strategies for adapting were not all successful and 
many commons have disappeared. Much has transformed into municipal property. 
In some cases local groups of volunteers have intervened to maintain aspects of 
the traditional commons that lack of use threatened to destroy, transforming the 
old style commons into some kind of community club (Shimada in this issue).
Takatsu in Murota and Takeshita (2013, 303–331) tells about a development 
in the shopping district centred around Kurokabe Corporation in Nagahama 
City that arguably can be analysed as the emergence of a new commons.10 The 
revitalization of the city centre required customers (the resource). How do you 
attract customers? To attract customers the commoners (the shop keepers of the 
district) went after what one might call “signature products”. Signature products 
are the antithesis to mass products. Signature products are one of a kind bearing 
the marks or signature of their maker (see Table 1).
A shopping district may be seen as “an eco-system” of active shops, dead 
shops, and shops growing up. Customers come to harvest from the eco-system.
The shopkeepers can also be seen as a club. They create local public goods 
that all can enjoy if they are members, including a pool of customers. By nature, 
some of the local goods are positive externalities, while some are negative. And 
sometimes one may find free-riding members of such clubs. This perspective 
does not explicitly include customers. But part of the positive externalities is the 
increase in customers that comes from the joint attractiveness that competing 
shops generate. This may also be called network externalities.
Analysing the transformation of a shopping district in the perspective of 
commons provides interesting perspectives on urban regeneration. The trend 
towards using the “commons” as a designation for that which one believes 
should be for common benefit within the community has not sparked many 
studies. Without more studies it will be difficult to guess about developments or 
implications either in general or for the established commons.
10
 This resembles Foster’s (2011, 104) discussion of Business Improvement Districts (“BIDs”), for 
some alternative views on BIDs see Ward (2006) and Peyroux et al. (2012). 
Table 1: Signature products.
Types of products  Material  Immaterial 
Signature  Artisanal products  Art performance
Mass-produced  Factory products  Internet entertainment 
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8. Enclosure of salt water fisheries: some observations from 
Norway
In Norway the commons of old comprise sea and mountains as well as forests and 
ordinary waste lands. Market forces reaching into the forest commons (15th to 17th 
centuries) and new technology enabling hunters to hunt more efficiently (late 19th 
century) and fishermen to catch much more fish than before (late 20th century) 
have all triggered processes that might be interpreted as tragedies of the commons. 
The right to harvest forest, to hunt, and to fish have in the aftermath tended to be 
individualized, or enclosed. But any causal link between overharvesting and the 
enclosure is at least complex and contingent.
In a judgement of the Supreme Court of Norway from 23 October 2013 (HR-
2013-02200-P) an administrative regulation from 2005 awarding a company 
fishing quotas without time limit was accepted as valid and could not in a new 
regulation from 2007 be given a time limit without violating the constitutional 
prohibition on retroactive application of rules. One may see this as a sign that the 
enclosure of the fishing rights in Norwegian waters has come a long way since 
1989 when the cod fisheries collapsed, leading in 1990 to the introduction of 
fishing quotas tied to particular fishing vessels.
Eythórsson (2008) provides interesting details from the enclosure of fisheries. 
He writes about the coastal fishers of Finnmark and their struggle to keep the 
fjord fishery as a commons for the local fishers. They failed in this, and for many 
reasons. The ethnic identity of the local fishers as Saami, the lack of understanding 
of the fjord ecosystems among marine biologists, and the strong position of 
the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association in the design and implementation of 
regulations, as well as the invasion of harp seals and the red king crab can all be 
seen to contribute to the deep crisis of the 1990s.11
 Both in the ministry and in 
the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association there was strong opposition to proposals 
for delegation of regulatory authority to local bodies. But the introduction of the 
valuable red king crab and the very profitable fishery on this species has made it 
possible to approach a kind of local fishermen’s commons. One may speculate 
that the lack of established interest groups around this fishery as well as the push 
from the Saami Parliament whose powers were growing during this period may be 
part of the explanation for this. There is no doubt that the general trend in the sea 
is towards individualized ownership (meaning identifiable owners, not individual 
persons) of resources. This goes on despite the fact that the Norwegian state is 
formal owner of the sea surface, the sea bottom, and the fish resources.
Fish farming may be seen as part of this process. The state as owner of the sea 
areas leases these to fish farms and collects fees for this, resulting in a de facto 
privatization of former “open access” areas. At the same time the owners of the 
permission to run a fish farm (the concession) has moved from local entrepreneurs 
to large scale national and international companies.
11
 For a summary in English see Broderstad and Eythórsson (2014). 
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The individualization of ownership that we see in fishery, fish farming, and 
in the exploitation of traditional rights of common on land, have a counterpoint 
in the large scale landscape and nature protection processes designed to exclude 
unwanted human activity within the protected areas. Today this means excluding 
local people as well as large scale commercial operators. The intended beneficiaries 
are the current and future population of Norway, based on a general idea about 
enhancing their welfare. The goods protected are public goods and sometimes 
club goods. Everybody profits equally from the reproduction of these goods. 
Hence funding of the necessary effort can be done by the general tax fund of 
the Norwegian state. The common pool goods that local commoners traditionally 
have exploited, have been managed by the commoners in a sustainable way for 
a long time. This can go on, but new ways of exploiting these resources and 
newly discovered resources worry the national nature protection bureaucracy. 
Legally, new modes of exploitation will have to be approved by this bureaucracy, 
which makes local populations who have traditionally managed these resources 
feel excluded from new methods of management and use of these resources. In 
2004 the Norwegian Parliament resolved to make it easier for local entrepreneurs 
to exploit the protected areas. As of 2013 this seems to have come to nothing 
(Fedreheim 2013). Protected areas are available for commercial exploitation only 
in theory.
The open access policy for salt-water fisheries resulted in declining resources 
for local coastal fishermen in Finnmark. Efforts to create a preferential position 
for the local fjord fishers in access to local fish resources came to nothing for a 
long time despite pressure both from below (the Saami organisations) and above 
(the political leaders of the Ministry of Fisheries12). One might guess that the 
fisheries bureaucracies found it contrary to their ideas about justice and customary 
procedures. The ability of bureaucracies to resist clear political decisions in the 
exploitation of protected areas and in the management of fisheries is a fact of 
life in complex modern polities. Sometimes it is an advantage for all, but as we 
see here, sometimes it will be to the detriment of what we think of as traditional 
commoners.
9. “Reinventing the commons”?
The fate of commons in the old industrialized countries can be read as a story 
of their disappearance. The age of enclosure is over. There certainly are enough 
statements about their waning significance.13 Berge and Haugset (2015) observe 
how rights of common in Norwegian commons during the last 150 years have 
12
 Since 1. January 2014 “The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries”. 
13
 Simpson (1986, 261–262) writes “The only parts of the country where common rights are still the 
backbone of the agricultural system are those mountainous areas where hill sheep-farming is prac-
ticed. Elsewhere common rights are rarely of great importance, nor is it normal today to grant new 
profits to be enjoyed in severalty.”
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been withering away. In countries where the disappearing has been most noted, 
the remaining commons get special purpose legislation. In others they are left to 
themselves. Does it make a difference? Fewer and fewer of the classical rights 
of common14 are exploited today, and no new types of rights of common have 
been added. If rights of common are not used there are no commoners, and if this 
situation lasts for a sufficiently long period, there will be no commons. This is the 
situation in Norway and in England. It is not the case in Spain and Japan, where 
the commons will remain, owned by the commoners they may recreate it if new 
valuable resources are identified. But as observed in Japan many commons have 
become municipal property exploited for the benefit of the municipal public.
But as the importance of traditional commons decline there seems to be a 
growth in the popular imagination about commons. People see the utility of sharing 
resources in various ways and they pick up the label “commons” to explain what 
they are doing. Wagner (2012) writes about this growth. The idolization of the 
commons could be observed at a meeting in Berlin in the fall of 201015 attended 
by very few traditional commons scholars. The organisers nonetheless stated as 
their key thesis that “Commons are the enabler for all other social goals, including 
environmental ones, which in essence are social.”
Listening to both public presentations and small group conversations gave 
pause for thought. The impression this writer took home was that for the majority 
of participants the commons represented a new ideology with some of the 
important desirable features of socialism, and few of the negative consequences 
associated with it. The IASC’s president was one of the keynote speakers and 
tried to introduce conceptual distinctions from the theory of the commons. But the 
academic approach seemed rather uninteresting for the conference participants. 
They, and apparently many more, share a belief in the need for, and desirability of, 
shared usage and management of resources that benefit communities.
In complex urban societies, scholars have started to look at public 
infrastructure as a commons (Hess 2008), applying insight from the study of 
traditional commons. The importance of the road and railway infrastructure has 
been highlighted (Frischmann 2012; Jain and Moraglio 2014). The importance 
of sharing knowledge has created the open access movement for a “Creative 
Commons” making copyright agreements more in line with every scholar’s 
wish to be read and have access to what others have written (Hess and Ostrom 
2007). In the same direction we find studies of “cultural commons” (Bertacchini 
et al. 2012). Property rights to, and management of the radio spectrum has been 
studied as a form of commons (Berge and Kranakis 2011), and so have microbial 
14
 Rights of common to pasture, to turbary, to estovers, to pannage, to piscary, and to a couple of 
profits à prendre such as to take minerals or parts of the soil and to take wild animals (Rodgers et al. 
2011, 4–7).
15
 See http://p2pfoundation.net/Berlin_Commons_Conference, http://www.commonsstrategies.org/
content/constructing-commons-based-policy-platform and http://calendar.boell.de/de/event/wohl-
stand-durch-teilen-gemeingueter-als-politische-leitlinie.
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commons (Dedeurwaerdere 2010), protection of nature (Zachrisson 2009; 
Lawrence, Molteno, and Butterworth 2009), the atmosphere (Paavola 2008), the 
oceans (Holt 1992), and other global commons (Buck 1998).
Two of the articles of this special feature take a historical approach. Can we 
learn anything useful from history? There are numerous reasons to expect that we 
cannot apply lessons from historical investigation of traditional commons to the 
management of new public goods commons. One is that the organisations created 
today govern goods of very different characteristics than those of traditional 
commons. Very frequently, new organisations are designed to care for pure public 
goods or very large-scale club goods. The processes that sustain their reproduction 
are very different from the traditional common pool goods. Another reason is that 
the organisation has to be created at a scale above the local community, often also 
at a scale above the state. But exactly how do new public goods resources relate 
to older private goods or common pool goods resources16 when both are found on 
land and both are called commons?
The theoretical approach to “new commons” is different from the approach 
that names urban squares as commons, or organizes sharing of academic works. 
The growth of “commons” as a kind of ideological driver for promoting the sharing 
of resources deserves its own study alongside the study of the organisations 
that actually call themselves commons. In both cases a few insights from the 
commons theory might help avoiding some of the possible errors and improve on 
our understanding of the complicated link between believing and doing.
10. Conclusion
The reduction of, or disappearance of, the medieval commons should not be 
lamented per se. But by forgetting about the old commons we forget about the 
reasons for developing this amazing legal technology in the first place. The many 
enclosures may seem to have simplified the landscape and disentangled the 
interdependence of interests and resources. But the simple landscape of dominium 
plenum did not last. Even before the turning points around the last half of the 
nineteenth century (some countries earlier some later) groups of people with 
stakes in the landscape appeared on the political scene and demanded their share 
of the values there. The enclosures had not managed to disentangle forever the 
multiplicity of partly interdependent users and partly interdependent resources. 
By the 1920s a new course in land use regulations pointed to the contemporary 
system of tenure.
Since the 1920s the drivers of change have been the advent of new concerns 
rooted in the interests of urban populations for access to nature and the protection 
of biodiversity, and the public health concerns about pollution and environmental 
degradation. The commons have reappeared but with new names. Today they are 
the lands of the National Trust, and the National Parks. They are seen in the parks 
16
 See contributions in Murota and Takeshita (2013) and Rodgers et al. (2011). 
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in the cities and the green belts around them. They are admired as world heritage 
sites.
Property rights have to be renegotiated continuously as society and culture 
change. In doing so the level of specification of rights tends to grow. The greater 
specification allows problems to be solved. The solutions to old problems fade 
into the taken for granted and new problems take centre stage. The dominium 
plenum solution to internalising the externalities could not accommodate the 
more complex world of modern democracies.
Owning and exploiting resources in common or jointly is an old problem. 
Only recently have scholars realized that the problems of free-riding in provision 
and consumption, well known from the study of traditional commons, return in 
new guises in modern industrial societies. Technology (radio waves, internet) 
and knowledge (biodiversity, ecosystem services) produce goods that require 
collective action in agreeing on common rules for efficient provision, sustainable 
exploitation, and just distribution. The new goods do not replace the old ones 
provided by nature (forest, pasture, wildlife), but appear as layered on top or 
beside the old goods. This reality creates a more complex problem of governance.
If we can see no continuity between the old well working commons and the 
new commons appearing in complex urban societies, the commons as a social and 
legal reality will have to be reinvented by trial and error. Fortunately the scholarly 
study of the new and old commons promises better approaches.
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